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.Abstract - SEACON is a hybrid (heuristic & algorithmic) 
expert system for contingency analysis and preventive o r  
corrective control of the transmission network, that has been 
recently redesigned to implement new end user requirements 
and to increase its performance. This paper describes the 
main results and the operational experience from the 
development and implementation of a new system based on 
the initial idea. Software reuse strategies became capital in 
this project. The new design includes advanced functionalities 
demanded by the practical use of the former system. Because 
of the high performance of the new system (up to fifteen times 
faster than the original) and its friendly user interface, 
SEACON has become a very valuable tool among dispatchers. 
SEACON is in operation in the Red Electrica’s National 
Control Centre and in Iberdrola’s Central and Regional 
Control Centres, dealing with transmission and 
subtransmission networks (ranging between 4OOkV and 
66kV), attached to the on-line state estimators and screening 
over 2000 possible contingencies. Results are presented using 
natural language, and a client-server scheme provided for 
corporate access. 
KeywOrdr - Expert system, security assessment, 
contingency analysis, power systems, real-time system, 
software reuse. 
L LVTRODUCF ION 
Security control is one of the most important aspects in 
power systems operation. Power systems are designed and 
should be operated to survive to all possible contingencies 
within the company security criteria. Energy Management 
Systems (EMS) implement functionahties to monitor the 
system security. The main one is contingency analysis (CA) 
whch assess the impact of a predefined set of contingencies 
on the power system. This tool is being widely implemented 
in EMS’S from the mid of 80‘s. However, security analysis 
has evolved since then. New domains can be processed in 
near real time, such as dynarmc stability and voltage 
collapse. 
Steady state contingency analysis has also progressed 
substantially thanks to the availability of Artificial 
Intelligence techniques. The selection of contingencies, the 
evaluation of their consequences and the search for 
corrective actions are getting more sophisticated. It is the 
case of the SEACON system and its evolution, presented in 
this paper. 
In 1988 Red Electnca de Espaiia (REE). the Spanish publi 
utility that owns and operates the transrmssion network. an 
Iberdrola (BD), the first ut~lity in Span. decided to develo 
an expert system that would reinforce the secunp in th 
operauon of their respective power systems That qsten 
named SEACON was imtlally coded in LISP in 
propnetary system (GENERA operatmg system on 
Symbolics computer) and was implemented i 
IBERDROLA Control Centre in 1991 and in Red Electnc 
North Regonal Control Centre in 1993 
The hrmtations of the Symbolics platform -the manufacturo 
had ceased the productton, and no new models wer 
avalable- were preventmg the two utilities to install th 
system addressing largkr network models. such as th 
Spanish model or meshed distnbutton levels In ad&bor 
end users had proposed several new features to improve th 
system, including user interface issues 
REE and Iberdrola decided to port the system to an ope 
environment. and to redesign it to include those demande 
new functionalittes. The project was developed jointly wit 
GRUPO APEX, S A ,  an active company in the Energ 
doman with a strong knowledge of Mathematics 
End users experiences in the onginal system have bee 
applied in the new development in order to carry out ne? 
improvements: automabc conbngency screening includin’ 
user selected ones, complex conongencies analysis usin! 
multiple post-compensatlon of Fast Decoupled Load Flou 
reactor contingency analysis. overvoltage contingencid 
treatment, integrated solutions screemng, etc 
This new SEACON has been installed in the REE‘ 
Nationat and North Regional Centre and in Iberdrola’ 
Central and Regional Control Centres In 1996. 
I 
IL BACKGROUND 
In th~s  section the imhal system SEACON is 
descnbed. See ref.[5] for more detl ls  Ths  old system wi 
be called as SEACON-I. 
Some defimuons were established in the first project, R hicl 
have been also used in the new one 
The lrmzts established for SEACON are related to th 
expected operator’s acbon. Two sets are considered 
0 Level I or immediate acbon limts. whch cannot bl 
violated any t.”, correspondmg to physical o 
protectlon limts Control actions in the presence o 
contingencies producing a violation of these lirmts wd 
\ 
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always be preventive. 
Level 2 or temporary limits, which can be tolerated 
during the average dspatcher’s reaction time after an 
incident. Control actions can, here. be corrective. 
The conringencies. according to the definition of limits. are 
classified as level 1 contingencies when they cause at least 
one violation of level 1 limits. the most dangerous ones, 
and. as level 2 contingen.cies, when only cause violation of 
level 2 limits. 
The security criteria used is the loss of a unique element (n- 
1). simple or complex 
The network states are defined according to the following 
terminology: 
.Vormal state: no magnitude exceeds its limits; the 
securiq criteria are achieved. 
.Alert stare: no limit violations but the security 
criteria are not fulfilled. 
Emergency state: one or more variables are outside 
their limits. 
TECHNIQUES 
Overload 
contingencies 
selection 
Voltage 
contingencies 
selection 
SEACON-I has been running using the EMS State 
Estimation output to define the network image. called Base 
Case or Network Current State. Single Contingencies were 
studied and predictive or corrective solutions provided to the 
users. to avoid or lighten the potential problems, dependmg 
on its severity. 
The system was solving contingencies according to the 
following sequence: first. once an SE solution was received. 
the sensitivity matrices were calculated. and the list of 
possible contingencies prepared: then the overload analysis 
and the voltage analysis modules were executed in this 
order. 
Heuristics 
Contingencies 
Performance index 
User selected 
contingencies. 
Pilotbuses 
selection. 
Heuristic filters. 
filtering. 
L,bltage contingencies methodology. 
Only undervoltages were considered in this voltage/reactive 
module. Voltages were monitored restricted to the buses 
defined as ‘pilot buses’. selected by power system operators 
or system engmeers. 
Selection of harmful contingencies. 
Initial undervoltages were detected in the same way 
than in the overload modules. If initial violations were 
detected, control was passed directly to the solutions 
modules, and once it was done. the normal contingency 
selection procedure was performed. T h s  submodule was 
performed in two steps. Former. three consecutive 
heuristic criteria, and latter. an anal4zical ranking 
procedure was employed. 
Analysis of selected contingencies. 
The selected contingencies were solved up to a 
certain mismatch tolerance by a fast decoupled load flow 
using postcompensation techniques. At this point. the 
control action determination submodule was called to 
find the solutions that would be advisable to operators in 
order to correct the limit violations. 
Preventive and corrective control actions 
determination. 
A hierarchical procedure was used to correct voltage 
problems. For each contingency. the system begins with 
the worst violation. In order to solve it, the higher 
priority and closer available control action is considered. 
If necessary. other control actions are considered. always 
begnning with the closest available of the remaining 
ones. All voltage violations are treated in the same way, 
and the procedure ends when corrective action for all of 
them has been found, or when there are no more ways to 
improve the voltage profile 
Overload contingencies methodology. 
First. the system tested whether the base case contained 
overloads in origin. In that case, it would pass the control to 
the solutions search module and once this is done, it would 
analyse the contingencies and their corresponding solutions. 
These steps are briefly explained in sequence. 
Selection and ordering of contingencies. 
No filtering was done for single contingencies: the 
complex ones were filtered using heuristhical criteria. 
The selection of contingencies was done using sensitivity 
coefficients, estimated from the impedance matrix. 
Contingencies were ordered using a performance index. 
Search and testing of solutions. 
SEACON-1 canied out the search of solutions for each 
overload produced by each contingency. Both local and 
global solutions were treated, and a decision tree was 
used to select the most appropriates ones. The tree was 
generated analysing the solutions experts had given in 
overload problems, first starting with local solutions, 
then the global ones, including generation changes and, 
finally, load shedding. 
Search of 
solutions 
Testing of 
solutions 
Muencearea 
selection. 
decision tree for 
overload. 
Hierarchical 
solutions searciung 
for voltage. 
I 
Table I Techmques usea 
Algorithms 
Sensitive coefficient 
and unpedance 
matnx based 
algonthms 
Fast decoupled load 
postcompensation 
techmques 
flow usmg 
Voltage sensitive 
matrices. 
Sensitive and 
impedance 
matrices 
Power Flow 
System (PFS) 
n SEACON 
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EL NEW FEATURES 
The new system. called SEACON-2, has been the result of a 
deep analysis of the basic functionalities of SEACON-1 and 
end user requirements (table 1). Main targets to develop 
SEACON-2 were: 
To include all the operators' needs arisen during the 
use of SEACON-1. 
0 To improve the user interface including a more 
friendly aspect and behaviour. 
e To increase the system performance allowing to deal 
with greater networks. 
To achleve a full portable code. capable to run under 
Open Systems, and therefore with no limits in the type of 
machine to be used. 
The specdied functional improvements for the project are: 
Svstem architecture. 
SEACON-:! is a POSE compliant development, coded in 
.ANSI-C and FORTRAN-90 under UNIX. User interface is 
coded in ANSI-C using Motif libraries. The portability of 
the new code has allowed to install the system in two 
different platforms: IBM RS6000 under AJX for REE 
system and Sun SPARC 10 under SOLARIS for IBD one. 
Selection of contingencies and anal-vsis. 
a) Overvoltage contingencies: So far the contingencies 
studied were those causing overloads in lines or 
transformers. undervoltages in bus bar. and finally 
islands ( m e s h e d  nodes). Now, overvoltage violations 
in bus bars are also analysed. As in undervoltage 
violations. two limits are defined for each bus bar: alert 
and emergency limit. Thls analysis may be important 
during low demand perid. Overload analysis also 
considers loss of reactors. 
b) Three winding transformer loss: Although the EMS 
models these transformers as three two winding 
transformer. now the systems treated them as a single 
special (three windmg) transformer. This improves the 
end user comprehension and allows the use of a faster 
algorithm based in a sensitive matrix. 
c) Compound contingencies selected by user: The 
original system only analysed single contingencies (loss 
of one of the following: circuit line. multiple-end circuit, 
transformer, generator or bus bar). The new system is 
capable to deal with compound contingencies: co- 
ordmted generator and circuit tripping (loss of circuit 
and generator) and general compound contingencies 
(loss of any combination of network equipment to be 
tripped simultaneously). SEACON-2 uses an user 
precompiled list. 
d) Integration between overload and voltage 
contingencies: They were processed separately in 
SEACON- 1. because of the different methodologies used 
(sensibility and impedance matrices methods in overload 
and decoupled load flow in voltage), and were presented 
to the operators in two separate groups. Now the list of 
contingencies is unique; one contingency listed can 
cause overload and voltage violations simultaneously. 
e) Generation contingencies analysis has been 
redesigned, modelling the effect of pnman; regulatioi 
over the transmission network. 
f) Generator representation has been improked 
including more detailed excitors and governors model 
The machme transformer has been included in thl 
network image. 
I , 
/ I \  
, 1 
Fig. 1 Control actions for solving violations 
Search and testing of solutions 
New kinds of control actions (soluhons) hate been include( 
to solve jointly overload and voltage violations As in thc 
ongnal system, the strategy and type of solutions used foil 
solvmg overload vlolations (independent solutions) d&e 
from those used for voltage (stacked soluuons). see fig 1 
The new funchonalibes are the followmg 
Overload control achons 
I 
a) Solut~ons searching has been ophmsed in order ti 
provide those soluhons that would solve or alleviate tht' 
maximum number of molabons due to the saint 
conhngency I 
b) Influence zone selechon has been improved tc 
m m m s e  m n g  bus effect over close overloads 
c) Modifying generauon schedule. SEACON-1 onlj 
worked wth  two generators simultaneously in eact 
solution. In the new system. generation changes td 
allewate overloads may include more than twi 
generators, in order to achleve a way of reasowng close1 
to the operators' one 
d) Improvement of the search for closing atailablq 
circuits. A fast algonthm based in the sensitile mat 
has been developed to detemne accurately the effe 
over the network of closing a circuit In the onginai 
system, t h ~ s  oluhon was only approxlmate 
e) Load reconnechon. The new system considers loac 
reconnechon between splitted bus bar 
to be used when combimng operations It can 
f) combinahon of operahons is considered 
loohng for overload soluhons. Experts defined the 
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expressed as follows: 
- When only topologcal solutions are found. the 
system investigates the combination of several non- 
topological operations. such as generation change or 
tap change. 
- When solutions consist of single non-topological 
operations. they would be accepted as valid ones. 
- When the system cannot find non topologcal 
single solutions, it would search for combinations of 
topological and non-topological single operations. 
In addition to changing voltage setpoints in generation 
busbars and transformer tap changers. voltage violations are 
solved: switching capacitors and reactors and leaving lines 
connected in antenna -just one end connected- this last 
action to increase voltage in the connected end. 
Integration between overload and voltage control actions: 
When a contingency produces overloads and voltage 
\.iolations, the system checks the effects of the overload 
control actions over the bus voltages. This is an important 
improvement. not only because an overload solution can 
also solve a voltage violation, but because of the security 
level the control action has. Original system did not check 
the effects of overload solutions on voltages, nor voltages 
solutions on overloads. 
l e w  simulator module 
The new system includes a simulator module that allows the 
user to execute any control action (fig. 2). In the network, 
followed by a complete contingency analysis, the operator 
can chain senes of control acuons and subsequent analysis, 
and then return to any intermediate state for checking 
different control hypothesis. 
i 
Fig. 2 Network operations in simulator module. 
Cser interface. 
The new user interface is Motif based and includes a 
graphic representation of the security level of the power 
system. Network states are associated to semaphores, 
representing the normal state as green light, the level 2 alert 
as yellow. the level 1 alert as orange and the emergency 
state as red. SEACON-2 shows separately the state of 
Merent voltage level networks. The contingencies. 
overloads or voltages, are also shown by coloured LED‘s. 
Figure 3 illustrates this idea. The colour code is the same 
used in the main window to manage the system outputs. 
The user interface also includes an alarm processor allonmg 
the operator to manage the contingencies causing violations 
as acknowledgeable alarm items. Two modes are possible: to 
show all contingencies causing problems; or just to shon 
unacknowledged ones. Using this second mode. the ?stem 
offers users incremental behaviour. helping to detect 
emerging problems. 
w. DEVELOPMENT S RATECt 
The initial system was developed in Lisp and implemented 
in a Symbolics U400  machine. Due to its lack of 
portability. the system was ported from GENERA operating 
system to UNIX and Lisp code was translated. (using 
CHESTNUT Lisp-to-C translator), to a standard C code. 
Although the translator produced ready to use C code. it was 
optimised in order to improve system performance and to 
minimise memory requirements. Furthermore. user feedback 
was applied to the C prototype to obtain the final system 
with the new features. At present, the system is fully 
portable and is running on an IBM RISC-6000 3BT (with 
A H  3.2) and on a SUN SPARC-20 (with SunOS 4.1.3). 
The user interface was built from scratch in Motlf (1.2.  The 
user interface menu driven and has been developed ve? 
closely to the users. It has two main windows: The analysis 
window where the contingency analysis results are 
presented, and the network state window. T h s  last Nindow 
provides a quick oveniew of the security level of the system. 
It contains three coloured semaphores. showing initial 
network violations and level 1 and 2 contingencies for three 
voltage levels (400. 220 and bellow 132 kV). In addition. 
the “acknowledgement” mechanism allows the user to filter 
known contingencies -i.e. structural contingencies-. so he 
can pay attention to new ones. 
The structure of the system is highly modular. malung 
easier its connection to different EMS’S. Essentially. i t  is 
composed on the reasoning core, the analytical modules. the 
EMS interface and topology generation and the user 
interface. 
v. OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND FURTHER WORK 
SEACON-2 has been installed in the REE national control 
centre in June 1996, and in IBD control centres in July 
1996. 
The ME’S model includes 1,800 busbars. 780 line circuits. 
600 transformers. 400 generators. 650 loads and 70 reactors. 
SEACON-2 processes every converged solution from the 
state estimator. The average response time of the ?stem. 
including data transmission from the EMS. contingency 
analysis and solution searching, is around 5 minutes. 
running under IBM RS6000 3CT. llus time means 15 times 
faster than SEACON-1 (table 2). 
In order to minimise the delay to show the contingencies 
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causing problems, the system shows the selected 
contingencies and the resulting violations prior to searching 
for their solutions, which are &splayed when found 
(individually). SEACON-2 begins to search the solutions 
starting from the worst violations. 
SEACON-2 was installed in the Iberdrola central 
Transmission and Distribution Dispatch Centre. located in 
Bilbao. and in the Regional Dispatch Centre in Valencia. 
The first analyses the 100kV down to 132 kV North-West- 
Central network. using a model of 430 electrical nodes. The 
second installation analyses the East region, which is 
loosely coupled to the former one. Here the model goes 
down from the transmission levels to the meshed 66 kV 
distribution network. including a total of 465 electrical 
nodes. In addition to the embedded interface, SEACON 
results are stored in a corporative Oracle database, making 
them available to most of users. 
SEACON-2 allows to manage. in study mode. historic 
scenarios from databases. Merent  from the current one, 
preventing the classical problems due to database 
maintenance. End user feedback became capital along this 
project. They suggested new requirements for thls system 
and they have collaborated during the product test phase, 
providing an useful information to adapt the system to the 
dispatch needs. Thanks to this collaboration. operators are 
much more confident in SEACON-2 results. The experience 
gained from this project is leadmg to new improvements in 
three areas: 
To include automatic one-line representation with 
navigation, zooming and panning facilities. 
To d a n c e  the contingency selection and screening 
improving compensated FDLF algorithm. 
To manage overloads caused by high reactive flows. 
Full integration of the SEACON-2 in EMS 
environment. 
To carry out some dynamic security considerations, 
mainly the detection of voltage collapse proximity. 
An important imhal effort in SEACON-I was denoted 
cope with the Merent  network representauons within ti 
REE and E3D EMSS A standardisatton ESPRIT project h; 
been iruhated (codename ”electronet”) aimng to PO 
SEACON and other applications to a uidelt accepte 
standard 
VI. CONCLLSIOVS 
SEACON-2 project has reached its man  target to get a 
on-line decision a d  tool for real-time operation. nith a 
response hme and a fnendly interface accomplishing 
end-users needs and requlrements. New improb ements ha\ 
given a great flexlbiiity to the system and allow a deep6 
analysis. 
The expenence has been qute sahsfactory in terms o 
robustness, low mamtenance needs -the automahc selechoi 
of contingencies has been quite appreciated- and goa 
results in the several months of operahon of the fina 
system Several unexpected potential dangerous situations 
due to scheduled mamtenance- have been detected an( 
appropnate actions taken 
The costs of analysis and development phases of this qstei 
have been reduced by software reuse techniques Th 
extensive use of LISP to C translator to mgrate the ongin; 
software and the integrauon of the new features in th 
already translated source code mrumsed costs and nsk 
guaranteeing the high quality of the results Actuallt th 
test phase showed that the old code was runrung error fre 
in the new implementation. 
Knowledge base reuse also reduced the analysis phase( 
allowing an incremental approach to the final system Thl 
base expert core has been preserved and the calculus modul 
has been the more changed one 
i 
REE National Iberdrola Central Iberdrola R e g i x ,  
Control Centre Dispatch Centre Dispatch Centre I 
I __ in Madrid in Bilbao in Valencia-- 
Transmission levels 132,220,400 kV 132.220.400 kV 66.132, 220.400 kV’ 
BUSS 
Bus bars 
Network Model Circuits 
Transformers 
Generators 
Loads 
1000 
1800 
780 
600 
SO0 
650 
430 
834 
675 
189 
88 
294 
-165 
9 17 
631 
365 
22 
256 
128MB 64MB 61MB 
Acerage of High load 105 12 30 
5’0”Wall clock hme High load 1’35” 7.28’‘ 
Conhngencies detected Low load 60 6 16 
Low ioad 4720” 1’10” 2’08” 
Table 2 Systems statistics and timing analysis 
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Figure 3:  Network state window 
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